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In the Federation established by The Government of India Act of 1935, residuary powers were given to the
Explanation
Section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, vested the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in his discretion.[2] The Act divided powers between the Centre and units in terms of three lists - Federal List (with 59 items), Provincial List (with 54 items) and the Concurrent List (with 36 items), and residuary powers were given to the Viceroy (Governor-General).[3] This arrangement differed from the current Indian Constitution, which vests residuary powers in the Union legislature under Article 248.[4] Under the Government of India Act, neither the Federal Legislature nor the Provincial Legislature had any powers of altering or amending the constitution.[5] This centralization of residuary powers in the Governor-General's hands reflected the colonial nature of the Act, where ultimate legislative authority on unenumerated matters remained with the British-appointed executive rather than being democratically distributed.
Sources- [1] https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_08.pdf
- [2] https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_08.pdf
- [3] Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
- [4] Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS > Residuary Powers. > p. 378
- [5] https://www.mea.gov.in/images/attach/amb/volume_01.pdf
PROVENANCE & STUDY PATTERN
Guest previewThis is a textbook 'Sitter' from the very first chapter of Laxmikanth ('Historical Background'). It tests the fundamental structural difference between the 1935 Act and the present Constitution regarding the locus of power. If you missed this, you are neglecting the static core.
This question can be broken into the following sub-statements. Tap a statement sentence to jump into its detailed analysis.
- Statement 1: Were residuary powers in the Federation established by the Government of India Act, 1935 vested in the Federal Legislature?
- Statement 2: Were residuary powers in the Federation established by the Government of India Act, 1935 vested in the Governor‑General?
- Statement 3: Were residuary powers in the Federation established by the Government of India Act, 1935 vested in the Provincial Legislatures?
- Statement 4: Were residuary powers in the Federation established by the Government of India Act, 1935 vested in the Provincial Governors?
- Explicitly states where residuary powers were placed under the Act.
- Names section 104 as vesting residuary powers in the Governor‑General, which excludes vesting them in the Federal Legislature.
- Notes that under the Act the Federal Legislature did not have constituent (constitution‑altering) powers.
- Supports the broader point that key sovereign-type powers were not vested in the Federal Legislature.
States explicitly that under the Government of India Act, 1935 residual powers were placed in the hands of the Governor-General rather than the Federal or State Legislature.
A student could check the Act's text or historical summaries to confirm the Governor‑General's statutory role and contrast it with the idea of vesting such powers in a legislature.
Explains the Act's three‑fold list scheme and states residuary powers were given neither to the federal nor provincial legislature but to the Governor‑General, highlighting the deviation from other federations.
Use this rule to compare other federations (e.g., Canada, USA) and infer that the 1935 Act was exceptional in assigning residuary authority to the executive.
Repeats that the 1935 Act provided three lists and that residuary powers were given to the Governor‑General, reinforcing the pattern across sources.
A student could treat repeated secondary‑source statements as corroboration and seek the specific Act provisions or debates to verify the allocation.
States in concise form that residuary powers were given to the Viceroy (Governor‑General) under the Act, directly addressing who held residual authority.
Combine this with knowledge of the Viceroy/Governor‑General's powers to judge whether legislative vesting was possible under the Act's structure.
Describes the redistribution of powers under the 1935 Act and notes that the Centre retained control through 'the Governor's special responsibilities' and discretionary powers.
Use this pattern (executive discretion at Centre) to infer how residuary matters might practically have been handled if not vested in a legislature.
- Explicitly states that under the Government of India Act, 1935 residual powers were placed in the hands of the Governor‑General.
- Direct comparison noting the Constitution later changed this arrangement, implying the Act vested residuary power in the Governor‑General.
- Affirms that residuary powers were given to the Viceroy (Governor‑General) under the Act.
- Presents this allocation as a specific feature of the 1935 Act's distribution of powers.
- States the Governor‑General was given exclusive legislative powers for British India, supporting the view of strong central/vice‑regal legislative authority under the Act.
- Corroborates centralization of legislative authority that aligns with vesting residuary power in the Governor‑General.
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- Explicitly states where the Act vested residuary powers (not in provinces).
- Names the specific provision (section 104) and the official (Governor-General) who held those powers.
- Records that Jinnah moved an amendment arguing residuary powers should 'rest with the province', implying the Act did not already vest them in provinces.
- Shows the issue was contested and that provincial vesting was a proposal rather than the enacted position.
Says under the 1935 Act residual powers were placed in the hands of the Governor-General (not federal or state legislatures).
A student could combine this rule with the constitutional idea that residuary powers vested in an office mean they were not with provincial legislatures, so test the statement by checking who held those offices under the Act.
Explicitly notes residuary powers were given to the Viceroy (Governor-General) under the Act, contrasting with provincial allocation of other lists.
Compare the listed allocation of Federal, Provincial and Concurrent subjects to see that residuary powers are treated separately — implying they were not provincial.
Describes provinces deriving authority from the Crown while the Centre retained control through the Governor's special responsibilities and discretion.
Use the pattern that governors held central control functions to infer residuary authority could be exercised by the Governor-General rather than provincial legislatures.
Sets out the three-list legislative division (Central, Provincial, Concurrent) under the Act, implying a structured allocation of subjects and a separate treatment for residual matters.
A student could reason that since provincial powers are confined to the Provincial List, any unenumerated (residuary) subject would lie outside that list and thus need a different repository under the Act.
Notes provinces and other units drew authority from the Crown and underscores the role of Governors as constitutional heads under the Act.
Combine this pattern with knowledge that the Governor-General represented the Crown centrally to hypothesize that residuary powers were centrally (Crown/Governor-General) placed, not with provincial legislatures.
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- Directly states where the Act placed residuary powers (names the specific section).
- Identifies the office (Governor-General) that received residuary powers to be exercised in discretion — contradicts vesting in Provincial Governors.
- Describes contemporary debate: Nehru Committee had vested residuary powers in the Central Government (not provinces).
- Records Jinnah's amendment arguing residuary powers should 'rest with the province,' showing provinces did not hold them under the Act.
Explicitly states that residuary powers were given to the Viceroy (Governor‑General) under the Act.
A student could infer that residuary powers being assigned to the Viceroy makes it less likely they were also vested in Provincial Governors and should check the Act's text or distribution scheme to confirm exclusivity.
Explains the Centre's retained control through the Governor's special responsibilities and his individual judgment and discretion in certain matters.
One could contrast 'special responsibilities' and discretionary powers of provincial Governors with 'residuary' assignment to see if these are distinct categories in the Act.
Says provincial Governors exercised executive authority on behalf of the Crown and were required to act on ministers' advice but had to act in their discretion in certain matters, showing Governors had defined discretionary roles.
Use this to distinguish routine/discretionary provincial powers from residuary (leftover) powers possibly assigned elsewhere (e.g., Viceroy).
Notes that under the Act all units, including Provinces, drew authority from the Crown and that Governor‑Generals and Provincial Governors were constitutional heads.
A student could use the Crown‑derived authority point to trace where unallocated (residuary) powers were formally placed in the Crown‑centred scheme—likely at central level (Governor‑General) rather than provincial.
Mentions Instruments of Instructions and reservation of certain bills to the Governor‑General or Crown, indicating a pattern of central reservation of special powers.
This pattern of reservation to the Governor‑General/Crown supports checking whether residuary powers were likewise reserved centrally rather than to provincial Governors.
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- [THE VERDICT]: Sitter. Direct hit from Laxmikanth Chapter 1 or D.D. Basu Chapter 1. No ambiguity.
- [THE CONCEPTUAL TRIGGER]: Evolution of Federalism in India. Specifically, the timeline of how 'Residuary Powers' shifted from the Governor-General (1935) to the Parliament (1950).
- [THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION]: Memorize the 1935 List counts (Federal: 59, Provincial: 54, Concurrent: 36). Contrast Residuary Powers: USA/Australia (States) vs. Canada (Centre) vs. India 1935 (Viceroy/GG). Also, recall that Dyarchy was abolished in Provinces but proposed for the Centre in 1935.
- [THE STRATEGIC METACOGNITION]: When reading Constitutional History, do not just read the text; draw a 'Power Matrix'. Ask: Who held the veto? Who held the purse? Who held the undefined (residuary) power? The British always kept the 'undefined' powers with the Executive (GG), not the Legislature.
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The question asks who held residuary powers under the 1935 Act; several references describe how the Act handled residual legislative authority.
High-yield for UPSC constitutional history: knowing where residuary powers were placed under the 1935 Act is essential for comparing it with the present Constitution and other federations. This concept connects to topics on distribution of legislative subjects and the evolution from colonial statutes to the Constitution, and often appears in comparative and historical questions.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS > Residuary Powers. > p. 378
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 15: Centre-State Relations > II Distribution of Legislative Subjects > p. 146
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
Multiple references explicitly state that residuary powers were given to the Governor‑General (Viceroy) rather than to federal or provincial legislatures.
Knowing the specific office that held residual powers is crucial for answering direct factual questions and for understanding colonial administrative control mechanisms. It links to study of executive powers, federal autonomy, and the rationale for constitutional changes in independent India.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS > Residuary Powers. > p. 378
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 15: Centre-State Relations > II Distribution of Legislative Subjects > p. 146
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
The 1935 Act's division into three lists is the structural backdrop to any question about residuary powers—who gets remaining subjects depends on this enumeration.
Mastering the three-list structure helps aspirants answer questions on distribution of powers, comparisons with single/double enumeration models (US/Canada), and why residuary allocation mattered; it is frequently tested in polity and governance sections.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 5: NATURE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM > NATURE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM > p. 60
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 15: Centre-State Relations > II Distribution of Legislative Subjects > p. 146
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
Directly addresses where unenumerated legislative authority was placed under the Act (vested in the Governor‑General/Viceroy).
High-yield for constitutional history questions: explains a key difference between the 1935 Act and post‑Independence Constitution and appears in comparative questions about allocation of powers. Mastery helps answer questions on federal residuary arrangements and historical shifts in authority.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS > Residuary Powers. > p. 378
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
Connects the residuary question to the Governor‑General's broader legislative role (assent, ordinance, individual judgment) under the Act.
Important for questions on executive-legislative relations under colonial statutes and for tracing continuity/discontinuity with the Constitution (e.g., ordinance power, assent). Helps tackle source-based and comparison questions about executive discretion.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 11: The Union Executive > It) Tlte Ordinance-making PQwer. > p. 219
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 3
The Act's three-list division sets the context; residuary powers concern subjects not in any list and where they were allocated.
Crucial for understanding federal structure questions: shows how list-based distribution creates the problem of residuary powers and why their allocation (to GG under 1935 Act versus Parliament under Constitution) matters. Useful for comparative and analytical questions on federal design.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 5: NATURE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM > NATURE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM > p. 60
Directly addresses which authority held the residuary (left-over) legislative power under the 1935 Act — central to the statement's claim about provincial legislatures.
High-yield for UPSC because questions often ask who held residuary powers under pre-1950 statutes and how that differed from the Constitution. Helps compare the 1935 Act's allocation with later constitutional provisions; useful for centre–state relations and constitutional history answers. Master by memorising the authority allocation and practising short comparisons.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS > Residuary Powers. > p. 378
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 1: Historical Background > The features of this Act were as follows: > p. 8
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The 'Instrument of Instructions' issued to the Governor-General and Governors under the 1935 Act is the direct ancestor of the 'Directive Principles of State Policy' (DPSP) in the 1950 Constitution. This is a prime candidate for a future 'source of constitution' question.
Apply the 'Colonial Trust Deficit' logic. The British Empire would never trust a 'Legislature' (filled with Indians/nationalists) with undefined, residuary powers. They would only trust their own agent. Who is the supreme agent? The Governor-General. Options A and C are eliminated immediately. Option D is too local. B is the only safe imperial choice.
Mains GS-2 (Federalism): Use this fact to argue that Indian Federalism has a 'Centralizing Bias' by design. The shift of residuary powers from the Colonial Executive (GG) to the Sovereign Parliament (Centre) in 1950 preserved the strong-centre unitary bias, unlike the American model where residuary powers lie with States.
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