Assume that India and Pakistan are engaged in an increasingly volatile situation over the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir with a Kargil type infiltration by Pakistan. A conventional war between both the countries is inevitable under the shadow of nuclear weapons. In this situation, what is the nuclear capacity that India should possess against Pakistan to deter a nuclear exchange ?

In a volatile scenario where conventional war is inevitable under a nuclear shadow, India's strategic requirement is a credible nuclear deterrence with a robust second-strike capability. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan attained nuclear capability, which significantly altered the dynamics of conflicts like the 1999 Kargil infiltration [2]. While Pakistan utilizes its nuclear umbrella to engage in irregular warfare and low-level provocations, India maintains a 'No First Use' policy. To effectively deter a nuclear exchange during a conventional escalation, India must possess a 'second-strike capability'—the ability to survive an initial nuclear attack and retaliate with devastating force. This capability makes it irrational for an adversary to escalate to nuclear use in response to a limited conventional defeat, as the cost of retaliation would be catastrophic. A readable and credible deterrence ensures that the stability-instability paradox does not lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange.

Sources

1. [1] Contemporary World Politics, Textbook in political science for Class XII (NCERT 2025 ed.) > Chapter 3: Contemporary South Asia > India-Pakistan Conflicts > p. 38
2. [2] Politics in India since Independence, Textbook in political science for Class XII (NCERT 2025 ed.) > Chapter 4: Indi External Relations > Fast Forward Kargil Confrontation > p. 66