The Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) of sugarcane is approved by the

States that for sugarcane the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution recommends the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP), distinguishing the recommending authority from CACP.

A student could check jurisdiction/responsibility differences between ministries (Agriculture vs Consumer Affairs) to infer which body likely approves FRP.

Explains FRP is a government-fixed price paid by mill owners and that FRP is fixed by government only for sugarcane (distinct from MSP procurement by government).

Use this distinction to focus inquiry on which government agency handles sugarcane-specific pricing versus general MSP mechanisms.

Notes that government announces MSP for many crops and FRP specifically for sugarcane, and separately describes the CACP's role when recommending MSP.

Since CACP is explicitly tied to MSP recommendations, a student could infer CACP's typical remit and question whether FRP (a separate instrument) falls under that remit.

States that MSPs are recommended by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) and approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA).

A student can extend this pattern (CACP→CCEA for MSP) to test whether FRP follows the same approval chain or a different one (as hinted by other snippets).

Presents a multiple-choice question asking which body approves the FRP, listing CACP among possible options — indicating the question is nontrivial and debated in sources.

Use this as an example that authoritative sources treat the approving authority for FRP as a distinct, examinable fact to verify (so one should not assume CACP without checking).

States that for sugarcane the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution recommends the FRP and that States may announce SAP; it ties FRP to a specific ministry rather than DMI.

A student could check which ministry typically recommends FRP (Consumer Affairs) and thus look for approval authority within that ministry or related committees, not DMI.

Explains the distinction: FRP is fixed by government only for sugarcane and is paid by mill owners (different from MSP procured by government).

Use this rule to narrow which agencies handle price-fixing (those involved in price policy for commodities) rather than agencies handling standards/marketing like DMI.

Describes the MSP-setting process: CACP recommends MSP and CCEA approves it, illustrating that price-setting involves CACP/CCEA for MSP and a formal approval route.

By analogy, a student can infer FRP likely follows a formal recommendation/approval route involving relevant price or cabinet bodies, so they can look for a similar chain for FRP rather than DMI.

Shows the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection (DMI) is an attached office concerned with standards (AGMARK) under the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare, implying its primary role is quality/standards not price fixation.

A student can contrast DMI’s standards/marketing role with price-setting responsibilities to judge whether DMI is the likely approver of FRP.

Presents a multiple-choice question asking which body approves the FRP, listing CCEA, CACP, DMI, etc., indicating that authoritative bodies (e.g., CCEA/CACP) are considered relevant options and DMI is presented for comparison.

Use the listed alternatives to focus further research on the more plausible approving authorities (CACP/CCEA) and deprioritise DMI unless supporting evidence appears.

Explains who recommends FRP for sugarcane (Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution) and distinguishes FRP/SAP as the price at which mill owners must buy cane.

A student could check institutional responsibility of that Ministry vs state APMCs (e.g., look up the Ministry's notifications) to see if APMC is the approving body.

States that FRP is fixed by the government (and paid by mill owners) and is distinct from MSP procurement by government.

Use this rule to infer that approval likely rests with a central government authority rather than a market-regulating body like APMC, then verify which central body issues FRP orders.

Notes explicitly that the government announces FRP for sugarcane (contrasting it with MSP for other crops).

This suggests FRP follows a government-level procedure; a student can compare the statutory powers of APMCs (state-level market regulators) versus the central government to judge plausibility.

Describes the MSP approval process (CACP recommends, CCEA approves) for crops—illustrates that price-setting can be a central recommendation/approval process rather than market-committee action.

By analogy, a student can ask whether FRP follows a similar central recommendation/approval route (and then check which commission/ministry handles FRP), reducing likelihood that APMC approves FRP.

Defines APMCs as state market regulators that manage mandis and first-sale marketing activities (including sugar) rather than central price fixation.

A student can combine this with the above that government announces FRP to infer APMC's role is market regulation, not national price approval—then verify legal mandates of APMC acts versus FRP notifications.