Question map
We adopted parliamentary democracy based on the British model, but how does our model differ from that model? 1. As regards legislation, the British Parliament is supreme or sovereign but in India, the power of the Parliament to legislate is limited. 2. In India, matters related to the constitutionality of the Amendment of an Act of the Parliament are referred to the Constitution Bench by the Supreme Court. Select the correct answer using the code given below.
Explanation
The correct answer is Option 3 (Both 1 and 2) because while India adopted the British parliamentary system, it introduced significant constitutional safeguards.
- Statement 1 is correct: The British Parliament operates under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, meaning no court can declare its laws unconstitutional. In contrast, India has a written Constitution and Judicial Review. The Indian Parliament’s power is limited by the federal structure, the distribution of powers, and the Fundamental Rights. Any law violating the "Basic Structure" can be struck down by the judiciary.
- Statement 2 is correct: In India, if an Amendment or Act involves a substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution, it is referred to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (comprising at least five judges) under Article 145(3). This mechanism ensures judicial supremacy in constitutional matters, a feature absent in the British model where no such judicial scrutiny of primary legislation exists.
PROVENANCE & STUDY PATTERN
Full viewA classic 'Concept vs. Procedure' mix. Statement 1 is foundational (Laxmikanth Ch. 2/3) and easy. Statement 2 is a procedural trap based on Article 145(3)—it sounds official but omits the critical qualifier 'substantial question of law,' making it incorrect.
This question can be broken into the following sub-statements. Tap a statement sentence to jump into its detailed analysis.
- Statement 1: In the British model of parliamentary democracy, is the UK Parliament legally sovereign (parliamentary sovereignty) so that Parliament is supreme over other state organs?
- Statement 2: In the Indian parliamentary system, is the Parliament's power to legislate limited by the Constitution and subject to judicial review by the courts?
- Statement 3: Does the Supreme Court of India refer matters concerning the constitutionality of amendments to Acts of Parliament to a Constitution Bench for decision?
- Explicitly identifies 'sovereignty of Parliament' as associated with the British Parliament.
- Describes sovereignty as 'supreme power within the State' and states there are no legal restrictions on Parliament's authority.
- Notes Dicey's implications that Parliament can make, amend or repeal any law (parliamentary supremacy).
- Affirms that the supreme power in Great Britain lies with Parliament and that parliamentary supremacy is a cardinal principle.
- States Parliament can make constitutional laws by the same procedure as ordinary laws (no legal distinction between constituent and law‑making authority).
- Says parliamentary laws cannot be declared invalid by the judiciary.
- Links the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty specifically to the British Parliament.
- Contrasts British parliamentary sovereignty with American judicial supremacy, clarifying the doctrinal position of UK model in comparative perspective.
- Explicitly states an independent Judiciary with power of judicial review restricts Parliament's supremacy.
- Says both the Supreme Court and High Courts can declare Parliamentary laws void and ultra vires if they contravene the Constitution.
- Affirms Parliament is not sovereign in the English sense because a written Constitution creates and limits Parliament.
- Specifies Parliament can legislate only subject to constitutional limitations like Fundamental Rights and distribution of powers.
- States Supreme Court and High Courts can interpret the Constitution and declare any law or executive action invalid if against the Constitution (judicial review).
- Notes the Supreme Court has held that core/basic principles of the Constitution cannot be changed by Parliament, indicating judicial limits on legislative power.
Describes the 'basic features' doctrine and notes that overturning Kesavananda (which concerns amendments) would require a Bench larger than the 13‑Judge Bench — indicating constitutional amendment issues attract reference to large benches.
A student could infer that questions about the validity of amendments are treated as sufficiently important to be heard by larger/Constitution Benches and check procedural rules on bench constitution.
Explains that clauses were inserted in Article 368 to prevent the Court from invalidating amendment acts, but the Court struck them down (Minerva Mills), showing the Court exercises review over amendments.
One can infer that because the Court undertakes significant review of amendment acts, it may convene larger or specially constituted benches (Constitution Benches) for such weighty questions.
Gives an example where the Constitutional (99th Amendment) Act, 2014 was held invalid by the Supreme Court — an instance of the Court deciding on an amendment's validity.
A student could review the judgment to see what bench heard it; if it was a Constitution Bench, this example supports the pattern that amendments are decided by bigger benches.
States that the judiciary has the power to decide whether an amendment violates the basic structure, implying that the Court adjudicates amendment-related constitutional questions.
Combine this with knowledge that Constitution Benches decide substantial constitutional questions to suspect such matters are referred to Constitution Benches.
Contains a test-item claiming 'An amendment to the Constitution of India cannot be called into question by the Supreme Court,' highlighting that the status of judicial review over amendments is a debated/important issue.
A student could use this to motivate checking landmark cases (Kesavananda, Minerva Mills) and the benches that heard them to resolve the apparent contradiction.
- Bullet 1. [THE VERDICT]: Mixed. Statement 1 is a Sitter (Direct Laxmikanth). Statement 2 is a Trap (Nuance of Art 145(3)).
- Bullet 2. [THE CONCEPTUAL TRIGGER]: Comparative Constitutional Law (UK vs. India) & Supreme Court Rules of Procedure.
- Bullet 3. [THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION]: Memorize Art 145(3) (Min 5 judges for constitutional interpretation), Art 143 (Advisory jurisdiction = Min 5 judges), and the distinction between 'Procedure Established by Law' (India) vs. 'Due Process' (USA).
- Bullet 4. [THE STRATEGIC METACOGNITION]: Don't just read that 'Judicial Review exists.' Study *how* it is executed. Note which cases require a Division Bench (2-3 judges) vs. a Constitution Bench (5+ judges).
Parliamentary sovereignty means the UK Parliament is legally supreme and can make, amend or repeal any law without legal constraints.
High-yield for polity and constitutional law: it is the core feature of the Westminster model and appears in questions about sources of constitutional authority, law‑making power, and limits on institutions. Mastery enables clear comparisons with systems that constrain legislatures.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 23: Parliament > SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT > p. 263
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 92: World Constitutions > T BRITISH CONSTITUTION > p. 678
Under parliamentary supremacy UK courts cannot invalidate Acts of Parliament, placing the legislature above judiciary in constitutional finality.
Essential for answering questions on separation of powers and constitutional adjudication; helps explain why judicial review operates differently in the UK compared with systems where courts can strike down legislation.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 92: World Constitutions > T BRITISH CONSTITUTION > p. 678
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 4: Salient Features of the Constitution > R I Synthesis of Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy > p. 29
Written constitutions (e.g., India, USA) legally restrict legislative power through entrenched provisions and judicial review, unlike the British model.
Important for comparative questions and for understanding constitutional design choices; helps tackle problems on constitutional supremacy, amendment rules, and institutional checks by contrasting Westminster and codified systems.
- Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity. 7th ed., McGraw Hill. > Chapter 23: Parliament > I Fundamental Rights > p. 264
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 4: Salient Features of the Constitution > R I Synthesis of Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy > p. 29
Courts can invalidate Parliamentary legislation as void or ultra vires, directly constraining legislative authority.
High-yield for constitutional law questions: understanding judicial review explains how laws are checked against the Constitution and links to remedies, separation of powers, and federal disputes. Mastery helps answer questions on constitutional validity, limits on legislation, and court–legislature conflicts.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 23: Parliament > Ell I System of Judicial Review > p. 264
- Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.) > Chapter 6: JUDICIARY > JUDICIARY AND RIGHTS > p. 139
A written Constitution imposes limitations (e.g., Fundamental Rights, distribution of powers) on Parliament's law-making competence.
Essential for questions on sovereignty, legislative competence, and amendment power; connects to topics like federalism, fundamental rights, and constitutional amendments. Enables analysis of when Parliament can or cannot legislate on particular subjects.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES > p. 92
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 4: OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION > OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION > p. 45
The Constitution strikes a balance between British parliamentary supremacy and American judicial supremacy, creating a mediated system.
Helps frame comparative and normative questions on institutional design, checks and balances, and the role of courts; useful for essay and polity mains answers requiring conceptual clarity on power distribution.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 4: Salient Features of the Constitution > R I Synthesis of Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Supremacy > p. 29
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 4: OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION > OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF OUR CONSTITUTION > p. 44
The judiciary can invalidate constitutional amendments that destroy the Constitution's basic features, limiting Parliament's amending power.
High-yield for UPSC because it explains the core constraint on Parliament's amendment power, links constitutional law, fundamental rights and judicial review, and appears repeatedly in questions on constitutional change and landmark cases (e.g., Kesavananda Bharati). Mastering this enables answering questions on limits of legislative power and landmark judicial interventions.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES > CHAP. 8 Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Duties 97 > p. 97
- Indian Constitution at Work, Political Science Class XI (NCERT 2025 ed.) > Chapter 9: CONSTITUTION AS A LIVING DOCUMENT > Check your progress > p. 213
The 'Shadow Sibling' to Art 145(3) is Article 143 (Presidential Reference). A reference under Art 143 MUST be heard by a minimum of 5 judges. Also, note that High Courts can also interpret the Constitution (Art 226/228) without a 5-judge mandate.
Check for 'Administrative Feasibility.' If Statement 2 were true, the Supreme Court (which handles thousands of cases) would need a 5-judge bench for every minor challenge to an Act's amendment. That is logistically impossible. Routine validity is decided by 2-judge benches.
This links to GS2 'Separation of Powers' & 'Basic Structure.' The fact that Indian Parliament is limited (unlike the UK) is the legal justification for the Basic Structure Doctrine—the Judiciary's tool to prevent legislative tyranny.