Consider the following statements: 1. Attorney General of India and Solicitor General of India are the only officers of the Government who are allowed to participate in the meetings of the Parliament of India. 2. According to the Constitution of India, the Attorney General of India submits his resignation when the Government which appointed him resigns. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

The snippet quotes the exact claim as a contested statement in a test question, showing this is a known proposition to be evaluated.

A student could treat this as a hypothesis and look up constitutional or parliamentary rules (e.g., Article references or Rules of Procedure) to confirm or refute exclusivity.

States that besides the Attorney General there are other law officers (Solicitor General, Additional Solicitor General) who assist the AG, and that only the AG is a constitutional office.

A student could infer that some law officers are non-constitutional yet perform legal functions and then check parliamentary practice to see which of these have permission to participate in proceedings.

Specifies that every minister and the Attorney General have the right to speak and take part in proceedings of either House (without voting).

A student could generalize this rule to ask whether other categories (e.g., other law officers or state officials) are similarly granted speaking rights by constitution, statute, or parliamentary rules.

States the Attorney-General has the right to speak in the Houses of Parliament and committees, and has privileges of a member under Article 105(4).

A student could compare the constitutional provision for the AG with provisions (or lack thereof) for the Solicitor General or others to assess whether similar rights are granted.

Shows that at the state level, the Advocate-General 'shall have the right to speak and to take part in the proceedings' of the State Legislature, indicating that non-member legal officers can have speaking rights by constitutional provision.

A student could use this analogy to check whether parliamentary practice or law similarly confers speaking rights on other Union law officers (like the Solicitor General) or on officials beyond AG/SG.

States that the Attorney‑General 'shall hold office during the pleasure of the President' — indicating the AG's tenure is at pleasure rather than fixed or explicitly tied to the Council of Ministers.

A student could combine this with the constitutional meaning of 'during pleasure' and examine whether a change of government automatically ends offices 'at pleasure' or requires resignation/removal procedures.

Notes the term of office of the AG is not fixed by the Constitution and the Constitution does not contain the procedure and grounds for his/her removal.

One could use this to test whether absence of removal procedure implies customary resignation on government change or leaves it to presidential pleasure/ political convention.

Describes the Advocate‑General of a State as appointed by the Governor and holding office 'during the pleasure of the Governor'—a direct parallel office at state level.

A student could compare central (AG) and state (Advocate‑General) practices: if Advocate‑Generals customarily offer resignation when state governments change, that analogy may suggest likely conventions for the AG.

Explains that although the Constitution does not lay down grounds for removal of governors, political practice has been to ask governors appointed by previous governments to resign when a new government takes office.

Using this historical practice as an example, a student might infer that constitutional silence often yields political convention (ask for resignations) and check if similar convention exists for the AG.

Contains an examination-style statement asserting (as a proposition) that 'According to the Constitution... the Attorney General of India submits his resignation when the Government which appointed him resigns'—showing the claim exists in study material as a debatable proposition.

A student could treat this as a prompt to verify the assertion against the constitutional text and conventions, not as proof, and seek authoritative practice or precedent.