With reference to anti-defection law in India, consider the following statements: 1. The law specifies that a nominated legislator cannot join any political party within six months of being appointed to the House. 2. The law does not provide any time-frame within which the presiding officer has to decide a defection case. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

Explicitly states that a nominated member becomes disqualified if he/she joins any political party after the expiry of six months, and may join within six months without disqualification.

A student could combine this rule with the Tenth Schedule being the anti-defection law to infer the law's practical timing restriction for nominated members.

Lists the four grounds of disqualification under defection law, including that a nominated member joining a party after six months incurs disqualification.

Use this enumerated rule to test the statement by checking whether the six-month allowance implies no restriction within the first six months.

Duplicate statement of the disqualification grounds confirming that nominated members joining a party after expiry of six months are disqualified.

Treat as corroborating rule-based evidence to strengthen the inference about the six-month window for nominated legislators.

Identifies the Tenth Schedule as the anti-defection law that governs disqualification for defections.

Connect the procedural rule in snippets (1,2,6) to the constitutional source (Tenth Schedule) to judge whether the described six-month provision is part of that law.

Contains a test-question phrasing that explicitly cites the six-month claim about nominated legislators in the context of the anti-defection law.

Use this as an example of how the six-month clause is presented in study material and cross-check it against the Tenth Schedule or authoritative commentary.

This snippet explicitly states that 'The law does not provide any time frame within which the presiding officer has to decide a defection case' — an example claim about the Tenth Schedule's silence on timing.

A student could verify by reading the Tenth Schedule text or comparing to House Rules to confirm absence of a statutory deadline.

States that the question of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is decided by the Speaker/Chairman and that such decisions are subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan case reference).

One could use this to reason that if no timetable exists in the Schedule, aggrieved parties may seek judicial review to challenge delay — so checking case law/time-to-decision statistics would test the claim.

Repeats that the Speaker/Chairman decides defection questions and notes Supreme Court reviewability, reinforcing the institutional role and availability of judicial oversight when the presiding officer acts (or delays).

A student could examine reported judgments where courts addressed alleged inordinate delay to infer whether lack of timetable in the Schedule has practical consequences.

Specifies the circumstances attracting disqualification and again identifies the Speaker/Chair as the deciding authority — showing the Tenth Schedule vests discretion in presiding officers.

From this, a student might check legislative procedures (Rules of Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha or state assemblies) to see if those Rules impose any internal timelines absent in the Schedule.

Explains the purpose and intent of the Tenth Schedule (to curb defections), which highlights why procedural clarity (like timelines) would be significant for its effectiveness.

A student could use this policy aim to justify investigating whether the drafters omitted timing deliberately or whether subsequent reforms/court orders have imposed de facto deadlines.