With reference to 'Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)', consider the following statements : 1. It is an organization of European Union in working relation with NATO and WHO. 2. It monitors chemical industry to prevent new weapons from emerging. 3. It provides assistance and protection to States (Parties) against chemical weapons threats. Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

States that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was acceded to by 193 states, framing it as a near-universal global treaty rather than a regional (EU) instrument.

A student could infer that the implementing body for such a widely‑ratified treaty is likely a global organisation and therefore check whether OPCW is an independent international body rather than an EU agency.

Lists major multilateral chemical/environmental conventions (Rotterdam, Stockholm) as examples of international environmental agreements (MEAs), illustrating that chemical regulation frequently operates through global treaties.

Use the pattern that chemical-related regimes are commonly global MEAs to suspect OPCW is linked to a global convention (CWC) and thus not necessarily an EU organisation.

Describes the formal status of International Organization Partners (IOPs) associated with a treaty, showing treaties often create independent institutional partnerships and bodies.

A student could generalise that treaty implementation often uses specialised international organisations (not regional bodies like the EU) and therefore look up whether OPCW was established by an international treaty.

Gives an explicit example of an initiative 'administered by The European Commission' (GCCA), showing the EU creates and runs its own institutions/initiatives.

Compare this model (EU-administered body) with OPCW: if OPCW were an EU organisation, one would expect similar phrasing (e.g., 'administered by the European Commission'); the absence of such language in OPCW descriptions would suggest it is not an EU body.

Discusses the EU's role as a regional political and diplomatic actor distinct from global organisations such as the UN or WTO, highlighting the distinction between EU institutions and universal international bodies.

A student could use this distinction to reason that organisations tied to global universality (like those implementing near-universal treaties) are separate from EU-specific institutions and should verify OPCW's founding instrument and membership scope.

States parties have banned production and possession of chemical weapons via the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), indicating an international legal framework exists targeting chemical weapons.

A student could look up whether the CWC creates implementation or verification bodies (and then check if OPCW is tasked with industry monitoring under that framework).

Annex-type lists and procedures (Annex III) show international treaties can list and regulate specific chemicals and trigger multilateral procedures for control.

A student could compare CWC/OPCW practice to other treaties' Annex procedures to see if similar listing/industry-notification or control mechanisms exist for chemical agents.

The Stockholm Convention example demonstrates that international conferences of parties can amend annexes to add industrial chemicals and regulate them, illustrating a model for international control of harmful industrial chemicals.

A student could infer that if other conventions use annexes to regulate industrial chemicals, the CWC/OPCW might use comparable mechanisms to oversee chemicals relevant to weapons and then seek confirmation.

The list of 'specific hazardous chemicals' (e.g., phosgene) shows that some industrial chemicals are explicitly identified as hazardous or restricted, linking industrial chemicals to potential weapon relevance.

A student could compile such named hazardous reagents and check whether international bodies (like OPCW) monitor their production or trade to prevent weaponization.

Descriptions of the chemical industry (scale, types of products, and downstream uses) indicate a large, diffuse industrial base that could be a source of dual‑use chemicals.

A student could use this to reason that effective prevention might require industry-level oversight and then investigate whether OPCW or the CWC includes industry monitoring or declarations.

States have adopted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a treaty that bans production and possession of chemical weapons, indicating an institutional framework for collective measures on chemical weapons.

A student could infer that a treaty implementing body (like the OPCW) likely has roles beyond prohibition (e.g., compliance, assistance), and then check OPCW mandate documents or CWC articles to confirm assistance/protection functions.

The Rotterdam Convention example shows an explicit objective to 'promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties' in managing hazardous chemicals, illustrating a pattern where conventions include cooperative assistance mechanisms.

By analogy, a student could expect the CWC/its implementing body to include cooperative assistance provisions and then look up specific CWC articles or OPCW programme descriptions to test whether assistance/protection is provided.

Membership in multilateral non-proliferation groups (e.g., Australia Group) is presented as enhancing security against chemical/biological threats, showing states use international organisations and regimes to prevent and respond to such threats.

A student could extend this pattern to hypothesize that the OPCW, as the CWC's implementing organisation, plays an active role in helping States Parties prevent or respond to chemical threats and then verify via OPCW resources.

India's doctrine explicitly treats biological and chemical attacks as security threats, implying states consider measures (including international cooperation) necessary to deter, respond to, or be protected from such attacks.

Using this recognition of chemical threats, a student might reasonably expect international instruments and organisations (like OPCW) to include protective or assistance provisions and then consult the CWC/OPCW text to confirm.