With reference to the Indian economy after the 1991 economic liberalization, consider the following statements : 1. Worker productivity (₹ per worker at 2004 - 05 prices) increased in urban areas while it decreased in rural areas. 2. The percentage share of rural areas in the workforce steadily increased. 3. In rural areas, the growth in non-farm economy increased. 4. The growth rate in rural employment decreased. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

States that after 1991 liberalisation the services sector became the fastest growing part of the economy and now contributes a large share of GDP while manufacturing's share is much smaller.

A student could combine this with the fact that services typically generate higher output per worker than low-productivity manufacturing/agriculture to suspect urban (service-dominated) productivity rose; then check urban GDP and urban worker counts to compute rupees per worker.

Notes that globalisation benefited well-off urban consumers with better choices and higher standards of living, implying rising urban incomes and consumption.

Use this as a clue that urban per-worker output or wages may have increased post-liberalisation and then compare urban nominal/real income series or urban GDP per worker (converted to 2004–05 prices).

Reports that liberalisation accelerated GDP growth (to ~6–8%) and transformed India toward a services-dominated economy (services ~55% of GDP), while also noting many people were left out.

A student could infer rising aggregate output (numerator) and, if urban employment growth was slower than output growth, expect higher urban output per worker; they would then compare urban employment and value-added time series to test the statement.

Gives evidence of falling national poverty rates and higher overall growth after 1991, indicating rising real incomes for many (aggregate welfare/productivity signals).

Combine national per-capita/poverty improvements with urban bias of globalization to hypothesize stronger urban productivity gains, then verify by calculating urban rupees-per-worker from urban GDP and urban workforce data at 2004–05 prices.

States that liberalisation produced regional disparities with concentration of investment in particular states (many of which contain large urban centres).

A student could use this to argue productivity gains were likely concentrated in specific urban areas (states listed), so they should check urban productivity trends at state/city level rather than only national urban aggregates.

States that agriculture was not touched by 1991 reforms and the rural economy ‘remained weak’, implying limited productivity gains in rural sectors compared with industry/services.

A student could compare sectoral GDP per worker time series (rural/agriculture vs national/services) before and after 1991 to see if rural rupees-per-worker stagnated or fell.

Notes that liberalisation shifted India from an agricultural to a services economy and that high growth bypassed a large section of people — suggesting gains concentrated outside rural/agricultural workers.

One could use national accounts to partition growth by sector and infer rural worker productivity trends by comparing agricultural value-added per worker pre/post-1991.

Explains that since the 1990s many organised-sector workers lost jobs and took low-earning unorganised jobs, and rural unorganised sector comprises low-income categories (landless labourers, small/marginal farmers).

A student might check wage and employment composition data (organised vs unorganised; rural wages) to judge whether average rupees-per-worker in rural areas fell.

Points out liberalisation increased regional disparities with investments concentrated in certain states, implying many rural regions may not have benefited and thus could see stagnant/declining productivity.

A student could map investment and state GDP-per-worker changes to test if lagging, largely rural states experienced declines in rupees-per-worker after 1991.

Provides labour-force distribution facts: about 70% of workforce in rural areas and higher rural unemployment — important context for interpreting aggregate rural productivity measures.

Using labour-force shares and unemployment trends, a student could compute rupees-per-worker (total rural value-added divided by rural employed) to see direction of change post-1991.

States that rural→urban migration has caused a steady increase in urban population (1951:17.29% → 2011:31.80%), implying a declining rural share of population (and plausibly workforce).

A student could combine this with census/workforce time-series to check if rising urban population coincides with falling rural workforce share after 1991.

Gives occupational-structure trend: primary-sector employment fell from 72.7% (1950–51) to 42.4% (2017–18), and rural workforce is mainly in primary sector — indicating long-run decline in rural/primary employment share.

One can map primary-sector decline to rural workforce share using labour surveys (PLFS/ census) to test post‑1991 trends.

Notes that rural economy remained weak after 1991, demand for manufactured goods from rural areas stayed low, and agricultural sector was largely untouched by reforms — suggesting limited rural job growth from liberalization.

Use this pattern to hypothesize that post‑1991 growth favored services/urban jobs; then compare workforce shares before and after 1991 to confirm.

Describes transformation from an agricultural economy to a services economy after liberalization, with services forming ~55% of GDP — implying employment growth concentrated outside agriculture/rural areas.

A student could check sectoral employment data (agriculture vs services) over 1991–present to infer corresponding rural workforce share changes.

Reports increase in area under non-agricultural uses and expansion of urban/rural settlements due to growth in industry/services — consistent with structural change and urban-centric development.

Combine land-use/urban expansion evidence with migration and employment statistics to test whether rural workforce share fell rather than rose post‑1991.

States that India's rural economy remained weak after 1991 while services and industry liberalized, implying limited demand from rural areas for manufactured goods.

A student could combine this with labour-market or district-level data (e.g., rural employment by sector) to check whether non-farm rural activity expanded despite weak rural demand.

Shows post‑1991 growth concentrated in services and that this high growth 'bypassed a large section of people', suggesting uneven spread of gains to rural areas.

Use regional/state-level GDP or sectoral growth breakdowns to see if rural regions saw rising non-farm output or remained excluded from the services boom.

Notes services were the fastest-growing sector after 1991 while manufacturing remained small (16% of GDP) and India's abundant resource was unskilled labour—characteristic of the rural workforce.

Compare occupational shifts in rural districts (agriculture → services/manufacturing) to infer whether rural non‑farm employment rose.

Reports increase in 'area under non‑agricultural uses' and expansion of rural settlements, a land‑use pattern often associated with growth of rural non‑farm activities and infrastructure.

A student could link land‑use changes with local industrial/commerce growth (e.g., rural markets, agri‑processing units) to assess growth in rural non‑farm economy.

Documents a fall in poverty and that reforms pulled a lot of population into the growth process, which could reflect increased non‑farm opportunities for some rural households.

Cross‑check timing and location of poverty reduction against rises in rural non‑farm incomes/employment to test whether non‑farm growth contributed.

Defines 'jobless growth' and gives a historical pattern: GDP growth rose while employment growth 'tended to slide down' (employment growth from ~1.5% to ~1%).

A student could check whether the slide in employment growth after 1991 was concentrated in rural employment by comparing pre- and post-1991 employment growth rates from labour surveys.

Notes post‑1990s liberalisation transformed India toward a services economy and that this high growth 'bypasses a large section of people'.

A student could infer that growth concentrated in services (urban/skill‑intensive) might not generate rural jobs, then test this by comparing sectoral employment shares over time (rural vs urban, agriculture vs services).

States services became fast‑growing after 1991 while manufacturing remained small and services 'employ fairly skilled people' whereas India has abundant unskilled labour.

One could extend this to hypothesise that rural (often less‑skilled) workers had fewer opportunities post‑1991, then verify via data on rural employment by sector and skill level.

Documents long‑term decline in agriculture's GDP share (over 50% to 16%) and a fall in agriculture's employment share (70% to ~42%).

A student might use this pattern to ask whether the rate of decline in rural/agricultural employment accelerated after 1991 by examining decade‑wise employment shares.

Argues the rural economy remained weak after 1991, reducing demand for manufactured goods and limiting rural‑led industrial growth.

This suggests a mechanism for declining rural employment growth; a student could look for regional/sectoral employment trends and manufacturing rural linkages after 1991 to test it.