Question map
Consider the following statements : 1. If the election of the President of India is declared void by the Supreme Court of India, all acts done by him/her in the performance of duties of his/her office of President before the date of decision become invalid. 2. Election for the post of the President of India can be postponed on the ground that some Legislative Assemblies have been dissolved and elections are yet to take place. 3. When a Bill is presented to the President of India, the Constitution prescribes time limits within which he/she has to declare his/her assent. How many of the above statements are correct?
Explanation
The correct answer is Option 4 (None) because all three statements are constitutionally incorrect.
- Statement 1 is incorrect: According to Article 71(2) of the Constitution, if the election of the President is declared void by the Supreme Court, acts done by him/her in the exercise of their powers and duties before the date of the decision are not invalidated. They remain in force.
- Statement 2 is incorrect: The election of the President cannot be challenged or postponed on the ground of any vacancy among the members of the electoral college. Per Article 62, the election must be completed before the expiration of the term, regardless of dissolved Legislative Assemblies.
- Statement 3 is incorrect: Article 111 states that the President shall declare assent or withhold it "as soon as possible" after a Bill is presented. The Constitution prescribes no specific time limit, leading to the concept of "Pocket Veto."
Since none of the statements are factually or legally accurate, Option 4 is the right choice.
PROVENANCE & STUDY PATTERN
Full viewThis is a classic 'Laxmikanth Sitter' that rewards depth over breadth. It targets the specific 'edge cases' of the Presidency (void elections, dissolved assemblies, veto timelines) rather than general powers. If you read the 'Notes & References' or the fine print in standard chapters, this is free marks.
This question can be broken into the following sub-statements. Tap a statement sentence to jump into its detailed analysis.
- Statement 1: Under the Constitution of India, if the Supreme Court declares the election of the President of India void, do all acts done by that person in the performance of presidential duties before the decision become invalid?
- Statement 2: Under Indian law or the Constitution of India, can the election for the President of India be postponed on the ground that some State Legislative Assemblies have been dissolved and their elections are yet to take place?
- Statement 3: Does the Constitution of India prescribe specific time limits within which the President of India must declare assent to a Bill presented to him/her?
- Specifically asserts that when the Supreme Court declares the election of President or Vice‑President void, acts done by him prior to the date of the decision shall not be invalidated.
- Links the resolution of presidential election disputes to the Supreme Court's exclusive and final jurisdiction, providing the legal context for that non‑invalidity rule.
- Provides that the President is not answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of powers and duties of office, supporting continuity and validity of official acts during tenure.
- Notes restrictions on instituting civil or criminal proceedings against the President during term, reinforcing the protective legal status of acts done while in office.
- Explicitly states that when a State Assembly is dissolved, its members cease to be qualified to vote in the presidential election.
- Adds that this disqualification applies even if fresh elections to the dissolved assembly are not held before the presidential election.
- Implies the presidential election can proceed without postponement for missing state assembly elections.
- Identifies the electoral college composition for the President as elected members of State Legislative Assemblies and elected members of Parliament.
- Shows which categories of representatives matter for the presidential vote, so absence of assembly members due to dissolution affects the electorate composition rather than mandating postponement.
- Restates that members of a dissolved assembly cease to be qualified to vote in the presidential election even if fresh elections are not held beforehand.
- Reinforces the point that dissolution of some assemblies does not automatically require postponing the presidential election.
- Explicitly states the Constitution does not prescribe any time-limit for the President to declare assent or refusal.
- Notes that Article only requires returning a Bill 'as soon as possible' and that absence of a time-limit permits a 'pocket veto'.
- Clearly says no time limit is imposed by the Constitution on the President to declare assent or withhold assent.
- Contrasts the President's discretion with the statutory requirement on the legislature to reconsider within six months when a Bill is returned.
- States there is no mention in the Constitution of a time limit for sending a Bill back for reconsideration, enabling the President to keep a Bill pending.
- Uses this absence to explain the practical effect called 'pocket veto'.
- [THE VERDICT]: Sitter. Directly solvable from M. Laxmikanth (Chapter: President) or D.D. Basu. No current affairs required.
- [THE CONCEPTUAL TRIGGER]: The Union Executive > 'Crisis Clauses' (What happens when things go wrong? e.g., Disputes, Dissolution, Delays).
- [THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION]: Memorize Article 71 (Election Disputes: SC decision final, acts NOT invalidated, vacancy NOT a ground); Article 62 (Election must be before term expiry); Article 111 vs Article 200 (President's assent vs Governor's assent); and the 1974 Supreme Court Reference case (Dissolved assembly is no bar).
- [THE STRATEGIC METACOGNITION]: Don't just read the 'Powers'; read the 'Limitations' and 'Procedural Gaps'. The Constitution is famous for what it *doesn't* say (e.g., no time limit in Art 111). Always ask: 'Does this silence create a power (Pocket Veto) or a problem?'
The Constitution vests exclusive and final authority to decide disputes about Presidential and Vice‑Presidential elections in the Supreme Court.
High‑yield for constitutional law questions on election disputes and remedies; connects to judicial review and separation of powers. Mastering this enables answers on which forums decide different election contests and on post‑election legal consequences.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 11: The Union Executive > THE UNION EXECUTIVE > p. 209
A judicial declaration voiding a President's election does not invalidate acts performed by that person prior to the decision.
Crucial for questions about legal continuity and state actions — shows how courts avoid disrupting governance despite later findings on legitimacy. Useful in scenarios on retrospective invalidation and administrative stability.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 11: The Union Executive > THE UNION EXECUTIVE > p. 209
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES > p. 101
The President cannot be made answerable to courts for exercise of official powers and duties during the term of office.
Important for topics on constitutional immunities (prevents immediate legal challenges to official acts), links to Articles governing executive privileges and procedural bars on suits. Helps answer questions on limits of judicial remedies against incumbents.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 8: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES > p. 101
The President is elected by an electoral college consisting of elected members of Parliament and elected members of State Legislative Assemblies; this determines who may vote.
High-yield for questions on presidential election procedure and constitutional provisions; connects to Articles defining roles of Union and State legislatures and ties into centre-state electoral dynamics. Mastery enables answering questions about voter eligibility and consequences of vacancies/dissolution.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 11: The Union Executive > 1. The President and the Vice-Prelideat > p. 205
Dissolution of a State Assembly causes its members to cease being qualified to vote in the presidential election, even if fresh assembly elections are pending.
Crucial for resolving procedural questions about timing of presidential elections versus state assembly elections; helps distinguish between altering electorate composition and postponing national elections. Useful for case-based questions on electoral timing and constitutional interpretation.
- Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity. 7th ed., McGraw Hill. > Chapter 18: President > ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT > p. 186
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 18: President > ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT > p. 186
Constitutional concern for uniform representation and parity between states and the Union shapes rules for the presidential electoral process.
Important for conceptual questions on federal balance in constitutional design and how representation rules affect election mechanics; connects to centre-state relations and representation-weight calculations in competitive questions.
- Laxmikanth, M. Indian Polity. 7th ed., McGraw Hill. > Chapter 18: President > ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT > p. 186
The absence of any constitutional time-limit allows the President to withhold action on a Bill indefinitely, creating the pocket veto.
High-yield for UPSC because it explains an informal executive power that affects legislative outcomes and executive-legislative relations; it connects to comparative study (difference with US 10-day rule) and helps answer questions on types of vetoes and presidential discretion.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 11: The Union Executive > g) Assent to legislation and Veto. > p. 217
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 18: President > Pocket Veto > p. 196
Since they asked about the President's time limit (Art 111), the next logical question is on the Governor's time limit (Art 200). Recent SC judgments (2023) clarified that Governors cannot sit on bills indefinitely, but the Constitution itself still sets no specific 'number of days'.
Apply the 'Doctrine of Administrative Chaos'. Look at Statement 1: If all acts of a President were retroactively invalidated, every law signed and official appointed during their tenure would become illegal, collapsing the government. The Constitution never allows vacuum or chaos. Therefore, Statement 1 must be False.
Connect Statement 3 (No time limit/Pocket Veto) to GS-2 Federalism. The 'silence' on time limits is currently weaponized by Governors against State Governments, leading to a breakdown in Centre-State relations. This is a perfect intro for a Mains answer on 'Gubernatorial Discretion'.