Question map
Consider the following statements : 1. Aadhaar metadata cannot be stored for more than three months. 2. State cannot enter into any contract with private corporations for sharing of Aadhaar data. 3. Aadhaar is mandatory for obtaining insurance products. 4. Aadhaar is mandatory for getting benefits funded out of the Consolidated Fund of India. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?
Explanation
The correct answer is Option 2 (2 and 4 only) based on the landmark Supreme Court judgement in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018) regarding the Aadhaar Act.
- Statement 2 is correct: The Supreme Court struck down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, ruling that private entities or corporations cannot be allowed to use Aadhaar for authentication purposes via contracts.
- Statement 4 is correct: Section 7 of the Act was upheld, making Aadhaar mandatory for availing subsidies, benefits, or services that are directly funded out of the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Statement 1 is incorrect: The Court ruled that authentication metadata cannot be stored for more than six months (not three months).
- Statement 3 is incorrect: Following the verdict, the requirement for Aadhaar for opening bank accounts or obtaining insurance products was invalidated as it did not meet the "proportionality" test.
PROVENANCE & STUDY PATTERN
Full viewThis question proves that 'Current Affairs' for UPSC includes landmark Supreme Court judgments from 2-3 years prior (2018 verdict asked in 2020). It demands 'operative details' (timelines, specific exclusions) rather than just the broad outcome. If a judgment is historic, you must memorize the 'Fine Print' of what was struck down vs. what was upheld.
This question can be broken into the following sub-statements. Tap a statement sentence to jump into its detailed analysis.
- Statement 1: As of 2020 under Indian law, is there a legal restriction that Aadhaar metadata cannot be stored for more than three months?
- Statement 2: As of 2020 under Indian law, are state governments prohibited from entering into contracts with private corporations to share Aadhaar data?
- Statement 3: As of 2020 is Aadhaar mandatory for obtaining insurance products in India?
- Statement 4: As of 2020 is Aadhaar mandatory for receiving benefits funded from the Consolidated Fund of India?
This source records the precise claim as an examinable statement (Aadhaar metadata cannot be stored for more than three months), showing that the three‑month limit is a circulating legal/MCQ proposition.
A student could treat this as a reported claim and look up the Aadhaar Act/UIDAI rules or the Supreme Court/Aadhaar judgments to confirm whether such a retention limit appears in primary law.
Describes UIDAI's role of collecting and storing biometric and demographic data in a centralised database, establishing that retention/metadata storage is an actual legal/administrative concern.
Combine this with knowledge that data‑protection/administrative rules often specify retention periods to check whether UIDAI/Rules set a 3‑month metadata cap.
Notes the Supreme Court's 2018 Aadhaar (Puttaswamy‑II) decision upholding the Aadhaar Act, indicating judicial oversight of Aadhaar's privacy implications and that retention/metadata rules would have been considered in related litigation or rules.
A student could consult the Puttaswamy‑II judgment and subsequent Aadhaar/UIDAI rules to see if the Court or rules imposed a three‑month metadata retention limit.
Addresses legal assertions about what Aadhaar can or cannot be used for (e.g., proof of citizenship, deactivation), showing that many specific legal limits on Aadhaar functions are the subject of statutory/rule/Judicial clarification.
Use this pattern — that specific operational limits are spelled out in law/judgment — to motivate checking statutory/regulatory texts for a metadata retention clause.
Shows that 'three months' appears as a specific legally significant period in other Indian legal contexts (preventive detention), suggesting three months is a plausible statutory timeframe used elsewhere.
A student might note the recurring use of a three‑month normative period in law and therefore give some prima facie plausibility to a claimed three‑month metadata rule, prompting targeted verification in Aadhaar rules/judgments.
This source explicitly records the exact claim as a test-item statement: 'State cannot enter into any contract with private corporations for sharing of Aadhaar data.'
A student could treat this as a recorded claim to be verified by checking the Aadhaar Act, Supreme Court judgments and government rules in force around 2018–2020.
Notes that Aadhaar is used by several state governments 'where legally allowed', implying legal limits on state use of Aadhaar data.
Combine with knowledge of relevant statutes/judgments (Aadhaar Act, Puttaswamy/Aadhaar judgments) to test whether those limits include contractual sharing with private firms.
Summarizes the K.S. Puttaswamy (privacy) and subsequent Aadhaar (Puttaswamy‑II) judgments which upheld aspects of the Aadhaar law and recognized privacy issues.
Use the privacy-rights framework from these judgments to examine whether the courts or Act imposed prohibitions on third‑party sharing by states via contract.
States that government contractual power is 'subject to some special formalities' and constitutional conditions, indicating contracts can be constrained by constitutional law.
A student could check whether those constitutional limits or prescribed procedures were interpreted to forbid state contracts sharing biometric/Aadhaar data.
Explains that government decisions to grant contracts/licenses can be challenged for noncompliance with prescribed procedure or violation of constitutional norms.
Extend by examining whether any procedure or constitutional requirement (or statutory provision in the Aadhaar regime) specifically forbids contracts sharing Aadhaar information with private parties.
Shows that UPSC exam writers considered the assertion 'Aadhaar is mandatory for obtaining insurance products' as a discrete statement to be judged (i.e., it was contested or tested).
A student could treat this as evidence the claim was debated and then check contemporaneous legal/notification developments around 2019–2020 to confirm whether law/rules mandated Aadhaar for insurance.
States the Supreme Court 'restricted the use of Aadhaar to welfare schemes in which the people receive benefits from the government', implying limitations on mandatory use beyond welfare.
A student could use this pattern to infer that private commercial insurance may fall outside allowed Aadhaar uses and therefore check judgments/notifications for exceptions or specific mandates for insurance.
Mentions rules about Aadhaar metadata retention and prohibition on state contracting with private corporations for sharing Aadhaar data—indicating legal constraints on data sharing and usage.
A student could reason that strict constraints on sharing Aadhaar data might limit any blanket legal requirement forcing insurers (often private) to mandate Aadhaar, prompting verification of regulatory guidance from IRDA or government.
Describes the JAM trinity linking Aadhaar to delivery of social security schemes like insurance and pension, showing Aadhaar's role in government-linked insurance delivery.
A student could distinguish between government-subsidised/benefit-linked insurance (where Aadhaar linkage is plausible) and commercial insurance, then check whether mandates applied only to the former.
- Majority judgment left Section 7 intact, and Section 7 makes Aadhaar mandatory for availing state subsidies and benefits.
- Directly supports that Aadhaar requirement for benefits was upheld by the court.
- Explains the scope of Section 7: it requires Aadhaar where expenditure is incurred from the Consolidated Fund, linking the mandatory requirement to such funded benefits.
- Clarifies that Section 7 makes Aadhaar mandatory in cases where expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India is involved.
- States the Aadhaar Act's main aim is to deliver state subsidies and benefits, whose expenditure falls under the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Connects the concept of state benefits/subsidies to the Consolidated Fund, supporting the linkage in the legal interpretation.
Says Parliament enacted the Aadhaar Act (2016) and that the Supreme Court 'restricted the use of Aadhaar to welfare schemes in which the people receive benefits from the government'.
A student can take this rule (Aadhaar use limited to government welfare benefits) and check whether 'benefits funded out of the Consolidated Fund of India' are the same category of welfare benefits covered by that restriction.
Contains an exam-style item that explicitly asserts as a proposition that 'Aadhaar is mandatory for getting benefits funded out of the Consolidated Fund of India' (presented as a contested MCQ statement).
A student could treat this as an indicator that the claim is legally contested and should be verified against the Aadhaar Act and relevant court rulings concerning mandatory linkage for government-funded benefits.
Gives an example of legal/administrative limits on Aadhaar use (e.g., metadata retention and restrictions on state contracts for data sharing), showing there are statutory/constitutional constraints on Aadhaar's uses.
Use this pattern (legal limits on Aadhaar uses) to investigate whether making Aadhaar mandatory for CFI-funded benefits would conflict with such limits or require specific statutory authorization.
Defines the Consolidated Fund of India as the repository for all revenues and payments of the Government — i.e., it is the principal source from which central government expenditures (including many benefits) are paid.
A student can combine this definition with the Aadhaar-use restriction (snippet 2) to ask whether 'benefits funded out of CFI' map onto 'welfare schemes' referenced by the Court/Act, thus testing the applicability of mandatory Aadhaar.
Also explains what kinds of receipts/payments form the Consolidated Fund (Article 266), helping to classify which government disbursements might be 'benefits funded from the CFI'.
A student could list common CFI-funded disbursements (pensions, subsidies, grants) and then check whether legal rulings/legislation treat those disbursements as welfare benefits allowed to use Aadhaar.
- [THE VERDICT]: Moderate-Tough. It requires precise memory of the Puttaswamy-II judgment details (6 months vs 3 months), not just the general 'Right to Privacy' concept.
- [THE CONCEPTUAL TRIGGER]: Landmark Supreme Court Judgments & Digital Rights. Specifically, the tension between Section 7 (Welfare) and Section 57 (Private Contracts) of the Aadhaar Act.
- [THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION]: Memorize the 'Aadhaar Verdict Table': 1) Bank Accounts/SIMs (Not Mandatory), 2) PAN Card/Income Tax (Mandatory - Sec 139AA), 3) School Admissions/NEET/UGC (Not Mandatory), 4) Data Retention (6 months, not 5 years), 5) Children (Biometrics not locked till adulthood).
- [THE STRATEGIC METACOGNITION]: When reading a judgment summary (e.g., Electoral Bonds, Article 370), do not stop at 'Constitutional/Unconstitutional'. You must list the 'Conditions of Validity'. The examiner loves testing the specific constraints (time limits, funding sources) imposed by the Court.
UIDAI was created to collect biometric and demographic data and store them in a centralised database.
Understanding the statutory role and data-handling mandate of UIDAI is high-yield for questions on Aadhaar policy, privacy, and administrative architecture. It links to topics on digital identity, data governance, and centre-state administrative bodies, enabling candidates to answer questions about who holds and processes identity data.
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > Disbanding Planning Commission and Setting up NITI Aayog > p. 780
The Supreme Court recognised the right to privacy and upheld the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar Act in the Aadhaar (Puttaswamy-II) judgement.
Mastering the privacy jurisprudence around Aadhaar is essential for questions on fundamental rights, legislative limits, and statutory safeguards for biometric systems. This concept connects constitutional law, landmark judgments, and policy debates on surveillance and data protection.
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 90: Landmark Judgements and Their Impact > K.S. PUTTASWAMY CASE (2017) > p. 641
Government contracts are governed by ordinary contract law but also subject to special constitutional/formal conditions and can be challenged for bad faith or procedural non-compliance.
High-yield for questions on state action and administrative law; explains why state agreements are legally distinct from private contracts and how they can be judicially reviewed. Connects to topics on separation of powers, administrative procedure, and judicial review; useful for questions asking when government contracts are invalid or challengeable.
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 29: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVANTS > RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVANTS > p. 426
- Introduction to the Constitution of India, D. D. Basu (26th ed.). > Chapter 29: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVANTS > RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVANTS > p. 425
Aadhaar is implemented through a central agency that collects biometric and demographic data and maintains a centralised database tied to a unique number.
Important for governance, privacy, and public policy questions involving digital identity systems; links to discussions on central vs state roles, data governance, and judicial scrutiny of identity programmes. Enables analysis of policy design, data security, and federal administrative competence in exam answers.
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > Disbanding Planning Commission and Setting up NITI Aayog > p. 780
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 90: Landmark Judgements and Their Impact > K.S. PUTTASWAMY CASE (2017) > p. 641
State use of Aadhaar for identity verification is permitted only within legally allowed contexts and has been shaped by Supreme Court rulings.
Useful for questions on the intersection of privacy, federalism and welfare delivery; helps frame answers about conditional use of Aadhaar, limits on governmental powers, and the role of courts in delimiting lawful uses. Prepares candidates for case-based questions on Aadhaar legality and state implementation constraints.
- Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24) > Chapter 8: Inclusive growth and issues > Presently, in India, identification of poor is done by the State Governments based on information from Below Poverty Line (BPL) censuses of which the latest is the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 (SECC 2011). > p. 257
- Indian Polity, M. Laxmikanth(7th ed.) > Chapter 90: Landmark Judgements and Their Impact > K.S. PUTTASWAMY CASE (2017) > p. 641
The Supreme Court limited Aadhaar’s permissible uses to welfare schemes involving benefits from the government, restricting broader mandatory use.
This is high-yield for questions on Aadhaar, privacy and constitutional law because it defines the legal scope of a major national ID scheme; it connects to Right to Privacy, direct benefit transfer policy, and implementation limits. Mastering this helps answer questions on whether Aadhaar can be mandated for services and benefits.
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > Disbanding Planning Commission and Setting up NITI Aayog > p. 780
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > JAM Trinity: Jan Dhan-Aadhar-Mobile > p. 779
The JAM framework used Aadhaar to link beneficiaries to bank accounts and mobile numbers to deliver subsidies and social security, including insurance/pension schemes.
Understanding JAM is essential for questions on financial inclusion, DBT and scheme delivery; it shows the administrative rationale for linking Aadhaar to welfare-related insurance access and helps evaluate policy trade-offs and outcomes.
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > JAM Trinity: Jan Dhan-Aadhar-Mobile > p. 779
- Rajiv Ahir. A Brief History of Modern India (2019 ed.). SPECTRUM. > Chapter 39: After Nehru... > Disbanding Planning Commission and Setting up NITI Aayog > p. 780
Baal Aadhaar (Blue Aadhaar): While adult rules are tested, the rules for children are the next logical target. Fact: No biometrics for kids < 5 years. Mandatory biometric updates are required at age 5 and age 15. Failure to update can lead to deactivation.
The 'Welfare vs. Commercial' Heuristic. The soul of the Aadhaar judgment was: 'Welfare (Public Money) = Mandatory; Commercial (Private Profit) = Voluntary'.
- Statement 3 (Insurance) is commercial -> Likely False.
- Statement 4 (CFI/Benefits) is Welfare -> Likely True.
- Statement 1 (3 months) -> Administrative logic suggests 3 months is too short for audit cycles (usually 6 months or 1 year). Eliminate.
Mains GS-2 & GS-3 (Data Governance): Use Statement 2 (State cannot share data with private corps) to argue for 'Purpose Limitation' in the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act debates. It sets the precedent that state data cannot be commodified.