Question map
If another global financial crisis happens in the near future, which of the following actions/policies are most likely to give some immunity to India? 1. Not depending on short-term foreign borrowings 2. Opening up to more foreign banks 3. Maintaining full capital account convertibility Select the correct answer using the code given below:
Explanation
The correct answer is Option 1 (1 only). In the context of a global financial crisis, the following reasoning explains why Statement 1 provides immunity while others increase vulnerability:
- Statement 1 is correct: Short-term foreign borrowings (External Commercial Borrowings) are highly volatile. During a global crisis, foreign lenders often withdraw capital quickly ("flight to safety"), leading to a liquidity crunch and currency depreciation. Reducing dependence on these loans ensures better macro-economic stability.
- Statement 2 is incorrect: Opening up to more foreign banks increases financial contagion. If parent banks in developed nations face a crisis, their Indian subsidiaries may restrict lending or pull out capital, transmitting the global shock directly into the domestic economy.
- Statement 3 is incorrect: Full Capital Account Convertibility allows local and foreign investors to move unlimited money in and out of the country. During a crisis, this could trigger massive capital flight, crashing the Rupee and depleting foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, only cautious debt management (Statement 1) offers a protective buffer against external shocks.
PROVENANCE & STUDY PATTERN
Full viewThis is a classic 'Conceptual Application' question. It doesn't ask for data but tests your grasp of the 'Stability vs. Exposure' trade-off in the External Sector. If you understood why India survived the 1997 and 2008 crises (limited exposure), this was a sitter.
This question can be broken into the following sub-statements. Tap a statement sentence to jump into its detailed analysis.
- Statement 1: Is reducing India's dependence on short-term foreign borrowings likely to increase India's resilience to or immunity from a future global financial crisis?
- Statement 2: Is opening India's banking sector to more foreign banks likely to increase India's resilience to or immunity from a future global financial crisis?
- Statement 3: Is maintaining full capital account convertibility likely to increase India's resilience to or immunity from a future global financial crisis?
- Identifies short-term external debt as a prominent capital-account item and makes the short-term debt / forex reserves ratio a relevant yardstick for reserve adequacy.
- Implicates that high short-term debt relative to reserves reduces a country's buffer against external shocks, so reducing it would improve resilience.
- Specifically links external exposure to global vulnerabilities such as sudden capital flight and contagion (transmission of foreign financial crises).
- Reducing short-term foreign borrowings would directly lower the risk vectors named (capital flight, speculative attacks, contagion).
- Provides the quantitative context: short-term debt is a significant component of India's external debt (21.6%), so changes in this component materially affect overall external vulnerability.
- Lists composition and currency shares of external debt, underscoring why short-term and dollar-denominated liabilities matter for crisis exposure.
- Directly links resilience of emerging market economies to banking-sector characteristics and notes a relatively smaller presence of foreign banks as a relevant factor for favourable resilience.
- Implies that a larger foreign-bank presence could reduce that protective factor by increasing foreign exposure in the banking sector.
- Identifies a potential benefit: foreign presence can enhance financial-sector efficiency.
- Also notes a potential risk: non-resident (foreign) investors are associated with greater volatility of capital flows, which can raise crisis vulnerability.
- Explains how financial crises transmit abroad when banks cover unpaid debt and scale back lending abroad, indicating cross-border banking links can propagate shocks.
- States repercussions are strongest in countries with close trade links and large financial exposure, implying greater foreign-bank presence may increase exposure to external crises.
This past-question frames 'opening up to more foreign banks' alongside other policies as a possible source of 'immunity' to a global financial crisis, implying it is widely considered one of the policy levers to affect resilience.
A student could use this to justify investigating mechanisms by which foreign banks might provide immunity (e.g., diversification of funding, expertise) and then check external data on those mechanisms.
Describes the typical functions of foreign banks in India (trade finance, wholesale lending, treasury, investment banking), indicating the kinds of services and capital flows foreign banks bring into the domestic system.
One could extend this by mapping how these services change domestic exposure to global shocks (e.g., treasury/investment banking links to global markets) using basic facts about global bank linkages.
States that foreign private banks with sizeable presence are mandated to follow priority sector lending rules, showing foreign banks would also be constrained by domestic regulatory obligations.
A student could combine this with the notion that regulatory parity may limit foreign banks' ability to move capital freely during crises, affecting resilience assessments.
Notes India's relatively small banking balance-sheet-to-GDP and low domestic bank credit to private sector compared to peers, implying scope/need for greater banking capacity.
One can extend this by reasoning that increasing foreign bank presence could raise overall banking capacity and diversification, potentially affecting shock-absorption; then check external data on credit growth and crisis transmission.
Lists benefits of larger, consolidated banks (greater ability to support larger lending, compete with global banks), offering an example that scale and global integration can change resilience and competitive dynamics.
A student might analogize that foreign banks bring global scale/skills and thus could enhance depth/competition, then test with external evidence on whether such features helped or hurt countries in past global crises.
- Explicitly warns that a more open capital account 'could impose tremendous pressures on the financial system', implying greater vulnerability rather than immunity.
- Mentions need for preconditions before liberalisation, indicating that immediate full convertibility would not automatically increase resilience.
- States liberalisation is 'handled with extreme caution given the potential for sudden capital reversals', linking full convertibility to the risk of rapid outflows that can undermine resilience.
- Refers to recommended preconditions and phased implementation, suggesting full convertibility without safeguards would increase vulnerability.
- Argues capital account convertibility should be a gradual process because institutional, market and policy frameworks must evolve to minimise risks.
- Implies that without such evolution, full convertibility would not enhance—and could reduce—resilience to crises.
States a general rule: full capital account convertibility can destabilize an economy via massive capital flows and makes exchange rates more volatile; prerequisites (stable macro parameters, adequate reserves) are recommended before moving to full convertibility.
A student could combine this with facts about India's current reserves, fiscal and external balances to judge whether full convertibility would likely increase or reduce resilience in a crisis.
Lists specific risks of capital account convertibility: exposure to global vulnerabilities, sudden capital flight, speculative attacks and contagion (transmission of foreign crises).
One could map these risks against historical episodes (e.g., crises with sudden stops) and India's exposure to FPI and external debt to infer likely impacts on resilience.
Presents a direct exam-style question asking which policies (not depending on short-term foreign borrowings, opening to more foreign banks, maintaining full capital account convertibility) give 'some immunity' to India from a global crisis—implying full convertibility is a contested factor.
A student could treat this as pointing to alternative protective policies and compare their mechanisms with full convertibility to weigh relative effectiveness in a crisis.
Describes Liberalized Remittance Scheme as 'baby steps' toward dismantling capital controls and notes that 'ideally capital controls have no place in a liberalised economy'—gives a policy trajectory and normative claim about controls.
Combine this with empirical knowledge of how partial liberalization behaved in other economies during crises to assess whether further liberalization (full convertibility) would help or hurt resilience.
Notes recent episodes (pandemic, Russia–Ukraine, monetary tightening and flight of capital from emerging economies) that led to capital flight—illustrating that global shocks have led to capital outflows from emerging markets.
A student could use this pattern of past capital flight during shocks to infer that opening the capital account might increase susceptibility to similar future outflows, reducing resilience.
- [THE VERDICT]: Conceptual Sitter. Directly solvable from standard texts (Vivek Singh/Singhania) chapters on BoP and Capital Account Convertibility.
- [THE CONCEPTUAL TRIGGER]: External Sector Vulnerability & Crisis Management. Specifically, the debate on 'Capital Account Convertibility'.
- [THE HORIZONTAL EXPANSION]: 1. Tarapore Committee Preconditions (Fiscal Deficit, Inflation, NPAs). 2. The 'Impossible Trinity' (Trilemma). 3. Guidotti-Greenspan Rule (Reserves vs Short-term debt). 4. Masala Bonds (Rupee denominated = less risk). 5. NEER vs REER trends.
- [THE STRATEGIC METACOGNITION]: Always categorize economic policies into 'Stabilizers' (Reserves, Capital Controls) vs 'Accelerators' (FDI, Convertibility). The question asked for a Stabilizer ('immunity').
The ratio of short-term external debt to forex reserves is a key measure of a country's immediate ability to withstand external shocks.
High-yield for UPSC: connects balance of payments, reserve adequacy, and crisis management; useful for questions on external vulnerability and policy prescriptions (reserve policy, debt management). Mastery enables evaluation of policy options (e.g., limiting short-term borrowings) and application of rules like the Guidotti–Greenspan concept.
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 17: India’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade > RESERVE ADEQUACY FEW MONTHS OF IMPORTS RULE VERSUS GUIDOTTI-GREENSPAN RULE > p. 497
- Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24) > Chapter 4: Government Budgeting > Govt. of India (Central Govt.) Total Debt/Liabilities = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 > p. 163
Sudden capital flight and contagion are direct transmission channels by which short-term external borrowings amplify global financial crises.
Important for answering questions on financial stability and external sector risks; links to topics like capital account management, macroprudential policy, and crisis prevention. Enables analysis of policy trade-offs (openness vs stability) and case-based arguments using past crises.
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 17: India’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade > Limitations > p. 499
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 17: India’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade > RESERVE ADEQUACY FEW MONTHS OF IMPORTS RULE VERSUS GUIDOTTI-GREENSPAN RULE > p. 497
The share of short-term debt and the currency mix (e.g., USD share) determine exchange-rate and rollover risks during global shocks.
High relevance for questions on external vulnerability, corporate sector exposure, and instruments (e.g., Masala bonds vs foreign-currency borrowings). Helps craft targeted policy recommendations (de-dollarisation, lengthening maturities, developing local-currency markets).
- Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24) > Chapter 4: Government Budgeting > Govt. of India (Central Govt.) Total Debt/Liabilities = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 > p. 163
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 9: Agriculture > MASALA BOND > p. 266
Foreign banks in India concentrate on trade finance, external commercial borrowings, wholesale lending, investment banking and treasury services.
High-yield for UPSC because understanding what foreign banks do clarifies how they can affect capital flows, liquidity and crisis transmission. Connects to topics on external sector, trade finance, and systemic risk; useful for questions on financial stability, crisis propagation and policy choices on bank entry.
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 7: Money and Banking > 24. Private Sector Foreign Banks > p. 178
Foreign private banks with a sizeable presence are mandated to meet the same priority sector lending targets as other scheduled banks (40% of ANDC).
Important because it shows that foreign banks contribute to domestic credit to vulnerable sectors, affecting distributive outcomes and resilience. Links banking regulation with rural/priority sector credit policy and enables answers on how liberalisation interacts with social/sectoral goals.
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 8: Financial Market > Priority Sector Lending > p. 240
India's bank balance-sheet size and domestic bank credit to private sector are relatively low versus global peers, indicating unmet credit needs and potential benefits of expanded banking capacity.
High-yield for framing arguments on whether opening to foreign banks addresses credit gaps or systemic vulnerabilities. Connects to questions on financial inclusion, growth financing, and comparative international banking structure; useful for policy evaluation and trade-offs in liberalisation debates.
- Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24) > Chapter 3: Money and Banking - Part II > 3.3 Should large corporate be allowed to open their own banks? > p. 131
Full capital account convertibility can trigger massive capital flows and exchange rate volatility unless macroeconomic deficits, external debt and reserves are suitably managed.
High-yield for UPSC: explains why policymakers sequence liberalisation and set preconditions before full convertibility. Connects macroeconomic stability, exchange rate management and external sector policy. Enables answering questions on trade-offs of liberalisation, sequencing reforms and policy safeguards.
- Indian Economy, Vivek Singh (7th ed. 2023-24) > Chapter 2: Money and Banking- Part I > Capital Account Convertibility: > p. 109
- Indian Economy, Nitin Singhania .(ed 2nd 2021-22) > Chapter 17: India’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade > Limitations > p. 499
The 'Guidotti-Greenspan Rule'. It states that a country's forex reserves should equal its short-term external debt (1-year maturity). This is the technical metric justifying Statement 1.
The 'Antonym Logic'. The question asks for 'Immunity' (Protection/Insulation). Statement 2 ('Opening up') and Statement 3 ('Full Convertibility') are mechanisms of 'Integration'. Integration is the opposite of Insulation. Therefore, 2 and 3 increase risk, not immunity. Eliminate D, C, B. Answer is A.
Mains GS-3 (Security): Link 'Financial Immunity' to 'Economic Warfare'. High external debt or foreign bank dominance makes a nation vulnerable to sanctions or weaponized interdependence (e.g., Russia SWIFT ban).